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**RUSSIANS HAND C.I.A. PAPERS
TO NASSER**

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EDITOR HAD DETAILS OF ANTI-NASSER COUP*from our own correspondent***Cairo :**

When editor Hassanein Heikal returned from his London visit early last week, bubbling with expectations of a new turn in Anglo-Egyptian relations, he had no clue of the storm-clouds that had been gathering during his ten days' absence.

Heikal had brought back with him a formula suggested by his English friends in important positions, and he was sure—so he said—that Nasser would play his part of the bargain in order to qualify for substantial Anglo-American aid and support. It all looked very rosy. But the hope was short-lived.

In fact, it did not survive Heikal's first encounter with Nasser. The President was in no mood for soft talk. On the contrary, he warned that he proposed to open a new page in Egyptian history: the foreigners would be taught a lesson they would remember.

Connection with Abu-Fath : Nasser advised Heikal, I am told, that he now had evidence of treachery inside his most intimate circles. Khaled Mohieddin, the editor of *al-Akhbar*, had brought back

from Moscow documents which the Russians had "acquired" in Washington, and wanted him to pass on directly to Nasser, without going through the normal channels.

The reason for this was evident from the documents. They were said to be reports prepared by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency proving conclusively that Mustapha Amin, the former owner and now managing-editor of the nationalised *al-Akhbar* publishing house, one of the most powerful journalists in the Arab world, was an agent of the American C.I.A.

Nor was that all. The documents showed also the Amin connection with the Abu-Fath network* and with what appeared to be a broadly-based movement designed to end the war in the Yemen and to oust Nasser.

Up to this point, the details can be

* Mahmoud Abu-Fath, owner and editor of the former Wafdist daily "al-Misri", has a network of anti-Nasser agents and clandestine radio stations throughout the Middle East and North Africa.

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established without much difficulty. But beyond this, one has to tread carefully.

Heikal close to the Amins: To return first to the Amin case. Mustapha Amin has never made any secret of his association with Americans, British and others. He knew that he was being watched. He probably exchanged the kind of information that diplomats and journalists exchange freely in most free countries. The Americans were probably more interested in his opinions and appreciations than in information or intelligence.

This was known to Nasser and he used Amin at times to ensure that certain opinions were passed on. But Mustapha Amin was trusted. So was his twin brother, Ali. So much so that Heikal asked Ali to go to London as *al-Ahram* correspondent, for whom he wrote a daily piece. On Wednesday, *al-Ahram* dropped his reports without explanation.

Heikal himself was close to the Amins. He was a pupil of Mustapha and greatly admired his journalistic ability. And it looks just now as if Heikal has not been entirely cleared of guilt by association. This brings me back to the source of all this. Here is the real clue to the situation.

Story of the plot: The real sensational aspect of the case, as it has turned out, was that the document which Amin handed to the U.S. first secretary Odell contained full details, names, of the attempted coup on July 16.

Far from being an invention, that coup came within an ace of success. It was planned by the former Number Two of the Egyptian airforce intelligence, Wing Comdr. Essam (Mohammed) al-Nasr.

Al-Nasr is closely connected with the Moslem Brotherhood leaders and especially with Rashid Mahanna, a former Regent of Egypt, who is still in prison. His group had many supporters in the airforce—especially among officers in the Yemen.

Planned new government: the plan was to bomb Nasser at his summer residence in Alexandria, to surround the headquarters of the General Staff, and to proclaim a new government. (On July 18, Field Marshal Amer summoned all senior commanders for a secret briefing on the coup. Immediately afterwards, army units stationed in Suez and Sinai began to re-deploy towards Cairo).

On July 16, Essam and his men arrived at Dakheila military airport. They told the commander they had to carry out a practice air parade with bombs. They had the necessary papers, but the local commander was suspicious.

The planes were loaded and prepared to take off, when the commander checked with Cairo and found he had been hoodwinked. Four of Essam's men

were killed in the shooting which followed. But Essam managed to take off and flew straight for Alexandria.

Officers arrested: He was chased by Migs and shot down in flames in the region of Wadi Natroun. All leave was cancelled. A number of senior officers were arrested, and many more detained on suspicion.

It rather looks as if the Amins have been framed in order to distract attention from the real centre of the movement. When I reported a fortnight ago that this was connected with the *al-Akhbar* publishing house, I stressed that it was based on the editor, Khaled Mohieddin, and his brother Zakaria, chief of the security police. I found no evidence of the Amins being involved.

It is surely more than curious that ten days after that report had appeared in the *JEWISH OBSERVER*, the Mohied-

din brothers should provide Nasser with evidence from Moscow, and from the secret police files, pointing at Mustapha Amin as the guilty person.

Warning to Egyptians: All this has left an air of uneasy disquiet among journalists and politicians. No one is quite sure what innocent act or association may suddenly be construed as espionage or conspiracy. Even important Egyptians are careful not to be alone with foreigners and avoid any discussion of current Egyptian economic or political affairs.

Stories of anti-Nasser plots have pushed into the background the round of speeches and parades that marked the revolutionary anniversary. Though the defensive tone in Nasser's speeches is strikingly obvious, so is the shrill warning that he means to keep control by whatever means may be necessary.